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INTRODUCTION
The Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) programme has been 
a relatively overlooked area of concern 
for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA).  Today, in light of 
Japan’s decade long period of economic 
stagnation and recession, the ODA 
programmes are under review.  This is 
especially true for the ODA 
programmes to China.
Having been the world’s top ODA 
donor since 1991, Japan is currently 
considering cutting back on its ODA 
budget.    The   reason   is  primarily 
due to  Japan’s  decade  long  economic
recession.  Koizumi Junichiro, Japan’s
Prime Minister, announced that there
will be a 10 percent cut in the ODA
budget for fiscal year 2002. This
reduction is causing many countries to
fight for their share of the funds.  In
response to this, a United Nations
official has cautioned Japan that the
budget cut will cause further economic
damage to the region (Japan Times
24/8/01).
ODA Aid to China is being debated
by many in Japan.  Many Japanese
believe that the amount of aid given to
China is too high since China is
thriving economically.  It has achieved
the status of the ‘world’s fastest
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growing economy’ and the World Bank 
has forecasted that China will surpass 
the United States as the world’s largest 
economy by the year 2020.  Many 
Japanese have expressed concern over 
China’s nuclear testing and its ever 
growing military.  However, Japan also 
believes that it cannot afford to risk 
damaging its fragile relationship with 
China  because   they   need  China   for 
economic and political reasons.
In this paper, reasons for cutting 
the ODA budget for China will be 
discussed. Despite the soundness of the 
reasons proffered by the Japanese for 
cutting the budget, this paper argues 
that Japan should not reduce its ODA to 
China.  The political fall out may be too 
onerous and limit a long-standing 
cornerstone policy of maintaining a  
good and mutually beneficial 
relationship with China. Its aid 
programme, however, should shift more 
towards achieving humanitarian goals 
aimed at trying to expedite social 
development in China’s poorer 
provinces.
BACKGROUND
Japan’s ODA programme is one of 
the most important features of Japanese 
foreign policy.  The ODA provides the 
political leverage needed in carrying out 
its bilateral relationships.  According to 
Zhao Quansheng, this is basically due 
to the fact that Japan’s constitution 
restricts its military involvement on the 
world scene, thus leaving Japan with
few options by which to exert
international influence.  Through the
use of international aid, Japan can
portray itself as a responsible great
power.  The use of ODA is the primary
economic tool used in carrying out its
political agenda in the international
security arena (Zhao 1996: 160).  Also,
according to Dennis Yasutomo,
economic aid serves the main purpose
of redeeming Japan from its wartime
transgressions by contributing
positively to the international
community.  Yasutomo summarises
that “ODA [is] Japan’s first genuine
step toward accepting the kind of
international responsibilities required of
greatness.” (Yasutomo 1995: 4)
Japan first began giving aid as a
prerequisite for its being allowed to
rejoin the international community after
its defeat in World War II.  The signing
of the San Francisco peace treaty of
1951 demanded that Japan pay war
reparations to 12 countries in east Asia
and to compensate for damage inflicted
on them (Fukushima 2000: 154-5).  Aid
to communist China began after Ohira
Masayoshi, Japan’s Prime Minister,
visited China in 1979 and declared that
Japan would cooperate with China on
its modernisation efforts (Soderburg
1996: 214).  With this political move,
Japan became the first non-communist
aid donor to China (Kawai and Takagi
2001: 15).
China quickly became the top
recipient of Japanese aid.  According to
the Japanese MOFA’s ODA annual
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report of 1999, China remained one of
the top two major aid recipient
countries throughout the period of 1996
– 1998, with a net amount of bilateral
ODA of approximately $1.2 billion in
1998.  The reasons for Japan’s large
contribution to China, according to
Alan Rix, are many.  They include:
compensation for wartime damages, the
lure of the huge Chinese market,
Japanese intentions to provide aid,
especially for constructions of
infrastructure, and the wish to build and
retain a friendly relationship with China
in order to attempt to stabilise the
fragile and unstable east Asian bloc
(Rix 1993: 138-9).
While both sides undeniably
benefit from aid, perceptions differ as to
who gains the most.  These differing
perceptions sometimes lead to conflicts.
To the outsider, it appears that Japan
benefits as much as China from its
ODA.  Japanese aid programmes
require “the compulsory use of
Japanese companies in feasibility
studies, the tying of aid commitments to
use of Japanese firms as project
contractors, and the sourcing of
equipment imports from Japanese
suppliers” (Austin and Harris 2001:
155-5).  These strings attached to ODA
have led to criticisms that indicate that
Japanese ODA is economically self-
serving.  Nevertheless, benefits to
China cannot be ignored.  Perhaps, the
most important fact is that Japanese aid
to China has helped build international
confidence in Chinese modernisation
policies. This has paved the way for
other countries and multilateral
institutions to start foreign aid
programmes that led to the triggering of
the explosion in economic growth and
development of China (Fukushima
2000: 182-3).
Despite the obvious advantages
associated with Japanese ODA,
problems and criticisms  still remain.
Both sides seem wary of each other’s
motives and intentions.  The enduring
perception among Chinese leaders is
that Japan ‘owes’ aid to China.  To
China, Japan must ‘repay’ for its
wartime aggression.  In addition, they
believe that Japan, being a wealthy and
developed country, is obligated to
provide assistance to developing
nations (Fukushima 2000: 175-6).
Aid Debate
Recent developments within both
China and Japan have led many
scholars to reconsider ODA issues.
Japan continues to suffer from its
prolonged recession with an annual
GDP growth rate hovering around 1.9
percent in year 2000 (World Bank
2001). In 2001 economic output
declined by .5% and prices fell at a
1.4% rate (sources: Cabinet Office:
Bank of Japan, Financial Services
Agency – Mininistry of Finance)
Consequently, many Japanese leaders
are beginning to rethink the ways ODA
is allocated to China.  The key question
they face is whether the amount of
ODA going to China is too large and,  if
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so, whether it should be reduced.
Although Japan has been China’s
top aid donor for years, Japan has
demonstrated that it is willing to
suspend aid to China should necessity
call for so doing. After the Tiananmen
Square incident, in response to
international pressure, Japan reluctantly
suspended aid.  That said, Japan was
also the first country to resume its aid
and normalise relations with China.  In
the eyes of the Japanese, a more serious
reason for aid suspension was China’s
nuclear testing.  This action by China
was in direct conflict with the Japanese
ODA charter.  One of its four principles
states that “full attention should be paid
to trends in recipient countries’ military
expenditures, their development and
production of mass destruction weapons
and missiles, their export and import of
arms, etc., so as to maintain and
strengthen international peace and
stability” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2001).  This concern is understandable
since Japan has experienced the effects
of nuclear weapons, is a non-nuclear
state, and is situated in an unstable
region.
From the Japanese perspective, it is
unacceptable to provide assistance to a
developing country that is rapidly
increasing its spending on a military
build-up and developing weapons of
mass destruction.  This is especially
significant given China’s geographical
proximity to Japan (Fukushima 2000:
195). Fukushima Akiko claimed, “many
felt that by providing ODA to China
while it continued its military programs,
Japan was actually subsidising Chinese
military posture” (Fukushima 2000:
192).
According to an editorial in the
Asahi Shimbun, another reason why
some believe that Japan should reduce
its aid to China is that China’s economy
has already achieved “more developed
country” status.  Because of this newly
acquired status, the International
Development Association and the Asian
Development Bank have de-listed
China as a recipient for their special
super-low interest rate loans (Asahi
Shimbun 29/10/01).  In other words,
China should now start to become more
self-reliant and use its own resources
for its own development. Moreover, the
MOFA claimed that China itself has
allocated $450 million in the year 2000
in economic assistance to 58 countries
(Asahi Shimbun 29/10/01).
The underlying principle of ODA
is what Japan uses to refute the
criticism that Japanese aid is too self-
serving, since most Japanese aid is
given in the form of loans requiring
recipients to repay.  This principle is
based on the assumption that a
government would feel compelled to
invest the loan wisely if it knows that it
will have to pay the money back at a
later time.  The loan system allows
recipients to invest the money provided,
rather than relying on handouts (Austin
and Harris 2001: 162). China, with its
history of autarky, maintains a strong
desire for self-reliance (Austin and
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Harris 2001:160).  If  true, then perhaps
one might reasonably argue that
Japanese ODA has, in a way, helped
China to become more self-reliant;
hence, China should start using money
from its own domestic savings and
relying less on Japanese ODA.
Reduce aid to China?
Few would suggest drastic cuts in
the amount of aid given to China.  Saori
Katada, professor of International
Relations at University of Southern
California, is quoted as having said that
aid is “one of very few political levers
Japan has over its powerful and difficult
neighbour” (Cohen, et al. 2001).  ODA
has become, and will remain, the one
core element of Sino-Japanese relations
(Zhao 1996: 176).
This writer argues that aid to China
should not be reduced. To begin, even
though many Japanese may believe that
Japan has paid its dues to those who
suffered under their hands during
World War II and that China has
become more self-reliant, the fact
remains that about 50 million people in
China’s western interior provinces still
live in poverty (Kreft 2001).  Thus,
China will still need to rely on ODA
from Japan.
Furthermore, some scholars believe
that although China is becoming more
capable of relying on domestic savings
for development, there are doubts about
China’s propensity to save and its
domestic savings may decline in the
future (Fukushima 2000: 167-8).  As
the propensity to save declines, there is
less money for investment, hence more
need for financial assistance from
elsewhere.  As a result, if the propensity
to save declines, Japanese aid will
continue to remain important, if not
essential, to maintain infrastructure
investment levels (Fukushima 2000:
167-8).  Simply put, as of now China
cannot afford to be completely self-
reliant.
In addition, Japan needs to give
priority to political and strategic
considerations.  In this case,
maintaining a long-term friendly
relationship with China should take
precedence over short-term economic
or budget concerns.  Japan has, on
many occasions, previously shown that
it places more importance on long-term
political and strategic concerns. As an
example, it chose sides with the West
by suspending aid after the Tiananmen
massacre (Austin and Harris 2001:
156).  That said, Japan was swift  in re-
instituting aid to China thus making it
clear that it realised that ODA is a much
better political tool than sanctions in
promoting human rights and
democratisation (Yasutomo 1995: 12).
Moreover, this relatively quick re-
instituting of aid to China may, in fact,
indicate that Japan sees its long-term
strategic well being as more closely tied
to China than to the West.
Japan should make an effort to see
things from China’s perspectives.
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Although China’s military expenditures
may be rising, it still is relatively low
compared to other major powers’
military spending.  According to
Christopher Hellman, senior analyst at
the Centre for Defence Information,
China announced an ambitious plan to
raise military spending by roughly 18
percent to approximately  $17 billion in
in  March,  2001.   He further said that,
it is widely accepted that China's
official defense budget significantly
underestimates actual military spending
-- some analysts estimate by 60 percent
or more -- and that actual military
spending is roughly $45 billion. In this
context, the announced eighteen percent
increase is actually a six percent
increase. (Hellman 2001)
 As for the fact that China
contributes aid money to other
countries, it should be understood that
this is merely an effort by China to
restore its international image as a great
power and from the humiliation it
suffered during its ‘century of shame’.
According to Fukushima Akiko,
one of the political goals for Japan’s
ODA programme to China is “to
support China’s policy of opening up
and reform launched in 1978”
(Fukushima 2000: 184).  This goal
should be the main reason why Japan
should continue and sustain its aid to
China.  Considering China’s entry into
the WTO, its high annual growth rates
averaging 9.7 percent between 1979
and 1999, and speculation that China
will become the world’s greatest
economic power by 2020 (Kreft 2001),
it will be to Japan’s advantage to strive
to be on good terms with China.
Shift not Reduce
Instead of reducing aid to China,
Japan should shift its aid programme to
one with a more humanitarian aim and
approach.  Four areas recommended by
a government advisory body according
to Kawai and Takagi, in which Japan’s
ODA to China should emphasise are:
“environmental protection; economic
and social development in the western
provinces including poverty reduction,
education and health; human resources
development and capacity building; and
promotion of mutual understanding”
(Kawai and Takagi 2001: 16).  Times
and conditions have changed and Japan
needs to change with the times and
circumstances.  As indicated in Japan’s
fourth loan package to China, the loan
did shift from infrastructure to
environmental projects (Fukushima
2000: 177).  This move is in line with
the MOFA’s first listed priority areas of
ODA to China -- the environment
(MOFA).
George Soros gives $500 million a
year in aid. It is aimed at social issues
mainly in the areas of legal change,
health care and education.  Mr. Soros
noted 5 problems associated with
traditional foreign aid. Some of these
problems include: “Programs are often
imported rather than home-grown.
Recipients rarely have ‘ownership of
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development projects”; “Lack of co-
ordination between donors makes it
easier for governments to divert aid”,
and “Aid is administered by bureaucrats
with little incentive to take the risks
required for successful projects.” (Wall
Street Journal, March 14, 2002)
It  is  the  author’s   belief   that  the
George Soros’ approach or a more
humanitarian approach in giving and
administering ODA can be used and
hopefully will prove to be more
beneficial.  Through continued aid
Japan will continue to be able to
maintain its close ties with China and
thus help to maintain regional stability.
The Japanese accusation that China
does not make public the actual amount
of ODA given for China’s development
and humanitarian aid will be lessened
since Japan will become more involved
at the local level with more face-to-face
contacts. People will be able to see for
themselves.  Furthermore, Japan will
still be able to retain its status in the
international community as a
responsible great power.  In the end, by
helping to improve social conditions
and the quality of life of the people in
the poorer provinces of China, the
overall economy will improve.
 A more personal aid  programme
that results in meaningful improvement
in the lives of the average Chinese
citizen cannot help but foster improved
citizen-to-citizen, and hence, nation-to-
nation relationships that should promote
the prosperity of both and the
continuing of important bilateral
relationships.  A potential problem is 
associated with the fact that according 
to Soros “Most foreign aid is 
intergovenmental, allowing recipient 
governments to divert funds for their 
own purposes.” (WSJ op cit) A more 
personal hands-on ODA programme 
would make diverting money most 
difficult therefore the Japanese may 
need to give some outright monetary 
grants without requiring total 
repayment of loans given for various 
programmes.
CONCLUSION
Japan’s ODA programme currently 
finds itself in the midst of a national 
debate as the Japanese government 
announced its plan to slash ODA 
budget by 10 percent for the 2002 fiscal 
year.  Aid to China is a more sensitive 
issue with scholars arguing both for and 
against the cuts.  This paper has 
discussed the reasons for making cuts 
and has attempted to refute those 
reasons.  Japan should not reduce its aid 
to China because over the long run, 
Japan will need China as much as, if 
not more than, China will need Japan. 
However, instead of giving loans for 
industrial infrastructure investments, 
this paper suggests that Japan should 
shift its emphasis and become more 
involved in aid for humanitarian 
purposes and social infrastructure 
development.  This may require some 
outright grants that do not require 
repayment. Through this realignment of 
aid emphasis, Japan should be able to
8Jane Jila Simmons
maintain and hopefully increase its 
close ties with China.  The long-term 
benefit from this sort of an ODA 
approach will be an advanced economy 
for both China and Japan.  Aid 
programmes that bring people-to-
people interchanges and contacts are 
one of the best ways to foster and insure 
mutual trust and understanding. These 
trust relationships and understandings 
can lead to meaningful long range 
nation-to-nation international and 
economic ties that can stand the test of 
time.
______
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